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a b s t r a c t 
This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach exploiting a substantial reform of the Dutch unemployment 
insurance law and a regression discontinuity design based on policy discontinuities prior to the reform to study 
the effects of the benefits entitlement period on job finding and subsequent labor market outcomes. Using detailed 
administrative data covering the full population, both identification strategies show that reducing the entitlement 
period increases the job finding rate. We find mixed results for the quality of the job-worker match, which we 
attribute to differences in the time period and the group of affected unemployed workers. However, all our 
estimation results show that a shorter benefits entitlement period substantially increases cumulative earnings. 

















































In most continental European countries the welfare state expanded
ntil the early 1990s. Since then the generosity of benefits schemes
as been reduced gradually. But compared to other OECD countries,
ontinental European countries still provide generous benefits (e.g.
mmervoll and Richardson, 2011 ). The Netherlands is no exception. Un-
il 2006, the entitlement period to unemployment insurance (UI) ben-
fits could be up to five years and most workers received 70% of their
ast earned gross wage during this period. 
Providing benefits for inactivity causes moral hazard problems. Un-
mployed workers may exert too little effort to find work or become
ore selective in which job offer to accept. Being selective is not always
ad. Unemployment benefits act as a search subsidy, i.e. individuals can
nancially survive without work and are not forced to immediately start
orking in the first available job, which might be ill-suited for them. In a
ystem with generous benefits, the quality of the match between worker
nd job may, therefore, be better. 
In this paper we study the effects of the length of entitlement to UI
enefits on the exit rate from unemployment and on subsequent labor
arket outcomes. We adopt two identification strategies. First, we ex-☆ Thanks to seminar participants at IZA-Bonn, CAFE workshop Vejle (Denmark), S
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927-5371/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. loit a substantial reform in the Dutch UI law in October 2006. Both be-
ore and after the reform the length of the entitlement period depended
n the individual labor market history, which is a function of age and
he number of years employed. The reform reduced the shortest entitle-
ent period from six to three months, and the longest entitlement period
rom 60 to 38 months. For some workers the entitlement period did not
hange or even slightly increased, which allows us to use a difference-
n-differences model to separate calendar time effects from the effects
f the changed UI entitlement period. Second, we use that before the
eform of October 2006, the UI entitlement period was a step function
f labor market history. In a regression discontinuity design we exploit
hat the actual age on January 1, 1998 determines the age component
n the labor market history. Being born just before or after January 1,
an change the UI entitlement period by up to twelve months. 
Job search theory predicts that the duration of unemployment in-
reases when the benefits entitlement period is extended. Empirical evi-
ence confirms this prediction. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) exploit
hanges in the Slovenian UI system and show that reducing the entitle-
ent period increases the exit rate to work and to other destinations.
alive (2008) finds that for Austria extending the entitlement to bene-
ts for 50 years old from 39 to 209 weeks reduces the job finding rate.pring Meeting Young Economists Vienna, ESPE Braga (Portugal), IZA Young 
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ard and Levine (2000) find mixed evidence of an extended benefits
rogram. A state level comparison shows that exit rates from the UI
enefits scheme remain largely unaffected, but individual data show a
ignificant reduction in exit rates. Schmieder et al. (2012) use disconti-
uities at ages 42, 44 and 49 in UI entitlement to show that the effect
f the entitlement period on the unemployment duration does not vary
ver the business cycle. 
Reduced job finding rates due to longer benefits entitlement are not
ecessarily bad, if the quality of worker-job matches improves. This is
he case if a longer benefits entitlement period allows workers to be
ore selective. But reduced job finding due to longer benefits entitle-
ent periods, may also cause more skill depreciation and job oppor-
unities to decline. It is an empirical question which of these coun-
ervailing forces prevails and at which margins. Card et al. (2007) ,
alive (2007) and Bennmarker et al. (2013) do not find any effect on
ost-unemployment wages, while Schmieder et al. (2016) find that in-
reasing the UI entitlement period decreases post-unemployment wages.
n contrast, Centeno and Novo (2009) , Cockx and Picchio (2013) and
ekoei and Weber (2017) find a positive but small effect of extending
I benefits on post-unemployment wages. 
We make two contributions to the literature. First, whereas earlier
tudies only consider a specific margin where exogenous variation in
he benefits entitlement period is generated, our UI reform and the pre-
eform discontinuities in UI entitlement provide more variation along
he full distribution of individuals. 1 This allows us to study more thor-
ughly for which individuals and at which moment the UI benefits enti-
lement period has an impact. Second, we follow individuals for several
ears after leaving the benefits system and the data contain many post-
nemployment outcomes such as earnings, working hours, type of con-
ract and sector. Our two identification strategies allow us to estimate
he effect of the entitlement period in two different time periods, a pe-
iod of economic downturn and a period of economic growth. Therefore,
e provide a more extensive analysis on the effect of the UI entitlement
eriod on the match quality between the worker and her job. 
In the empirical analysis, we use administrative data on all UI ben-
fits spells which started between January 2004 and December 2008
n the Netherlands. This includes in total over 500,000 spells. We com-
ine these data with other administrative datasets provided by Statistics
etherlands to observe demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
s well as post-unemployment labor market outcomes. For the period
ntil 2010 we observe earnings, working hours and type of contract in
ll jobs after unemployment. In addition, we observe eligibility and re-
eipt of other types of benefits. 
The estimation results for the effects on job finding from our
ifference-in-differences analysis and regression discontinuity approach
oncur even though identification in the two methods comes from dif-
erent time periods and different groups of individuals. The empirical
esults support the earlier literature that reducing the entitlement pe-
iod to UI benefits increases job finding rates. The effects on job finding
ates are positive from the start of unemployment, but peak just before
he end of UI benefits entitlement. Cumulative UI benefits payments are
ignificantly lower, but this is more than fully compensated by addi-
ional earnings from work. 
Previous studies on the effects of the entitlement period on job qual-
ty find mixed results. We find mixed results for job quality as well. For
he difference-in-differences analysis – which estimates the effects of1 For example, Nekoei and Weber (2017) , Lalive (2008) , and 
ennmarker et al. (2013) study unemployed workers at the 40, 50 and 
5-year old threshold, respectively, while Schmieder et al. (2012) and 
chmieder et al. (2016) study unemployed workers at the 42, 44 and 49-year 
hreshold. Furthermore, Card et al. (2007) consider both extended severance 
ayments for laid-off workers who have worked at least three years at their 
revious employer and the discontinuity in the entitlement period around the 











196 educing the UI entitlement period in a period of declining unemploy-
ent rates – we find a modest negative effect on wages and a positive
ffect on accepting a temporary job immediately after unemployment.
hese results suggest that unemployed workers lower their reservation
ages and job demands when faced with a shorter UI entitlement period.
he long-run effects show increased job turnover, increasing the prob-
bility of having a permanent contract and more working hours three
ears after becoming unemployed. On the other hand, the regression
iscontinuity analysis – which estimates the effects during a period of
ncreasing unemployment rates – suggests that reducing the entitlement
eriod has no effects on wages or the probability of accepting a tempo-
ary contract, both for the first job after unemployment and later jobs.
he results show a small positive effect on the number of hours in the
rst job, and for the long run we find positive effects on the wage and
umber of working hours. The results from the two separate analyses
uggest that even within the same country and institutional setting, the
ffects on job quality depend on the economic conditions or the group
f workers affected by the entitlement reduction. The latter may also
xplain why there is no consensus in the literature about the effect of
he UI entitlement period on job quality. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide some
heoretical background. In Section 3 we describe the Dutch UI system
nd the reform of October 2006. In Section 4 we present our data. We
iscuss the effects of reducing the entitlement period on job finding and
ther labor market outcomes in Sections 5 and 6 , where we discuss
he difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity approaches,
espectively. In Section 7 we explore the underlying job finding mecha-
ism. Our conclusions are presented in Section 8 . 
. Job search theory and expected effects 
Job search models describe the behavior of unemployed workers
e.g. Mortensen, 1986; Van den Berg, 1990 ). Each period the unem-
loyed worker decides to which vacancies to send a job application.
ach job application can result in a job offer. Whether or not such a
ob offer is acceptable for the unemployed worker depends on the char-
cteristics of the job and the worker’s labor market prospects. For ease
f exposition theoretical models often impose that jobs are character-
zed by the wage. In our empirical analysis we also consider other job
haracteristics as measures for the quality of a job. 
Job search theory assumes that unemployed workers maximize the
resent value of their lifetime utility, where utility is a function of in-
ome and leisure. When all jobs are full-time, the job offer acceptance
ecision is based on a reservation wage strategy. Each period the unem-
loyed worker chooses a reservation wage and accepts a job offer if the
ssociated wage exceeds the reservation wage in that period. Further-
ore, in each period the unemployed worker determines the number of
ob applications such that the marginal costs of a job application equal
he marginal returns. 
The generosity of unemployment benefits plays a key role in job
earch decisions. If benefits are generous, either in level or length of the
ntitlement period, theory predicts that unemployed workers increase
heir reservation wage. Unemployed workers are thus more selective in
hich job offers to accept. If a worker accepts a job offer in a particular
eriod, the wage – or more general job quality – will be higher if the
ob was found in a generous benefits system. 
Increasing the reservation wage reduces the marginal benefits of
earch, which implies that the optimal number of job applications is
ower. Therefore, a more generous unemployment benefits scheme re-
uces the job finding rate both because unemployed workers become
ore selective and because they search less intensively. These behav-
oral responses are referred to as moral hazard. Whereas being selective
n job offers has the positive effect that the match between the worker
nd job improves which may have long-term consequences, the reduc-
ion in job applications only causes unemployment durations to become
onger. At the same time, these longer unemployment durations can po-



























































Entitlement and level of UI benefits before and after the reform. 
Before reform After reform 
Short term UI 
When entitled Worked 26 of last 39 weeks Worked 26 of last 36 weeks 
Level UI 70% of minimum wage 70–75% of last earned wage 
Duration 6 months 3 months 
Long term UI 
When entitled Worked 26 of last 39 weeks Worked 26 of last 36 weeks 
Worked 4 out of 5 years Worked 4 out of 5 years 
Level UI 70% of last earned wage 70-75% of last earned wage 
Duration 6-60 months 4-38 months 
Note: The regression discontinuity analysis uses data before the reform 
and focuses on individuals close to the jumps in benefits entitlement. The 
difference-in-differences model is estimated on data before and after the 
reform. For both analysis we restrict the data to individuals entitled to long 




































b  entially offset the positive effect on job quality, because of the reduced
rrival of job offers and depreciation of skills. It is not clear which of
hese two countervailing forces prevails. 
Van den Berg (1990) discusses a job search model taking account
f limited entitlement to UI benefits. In the model the present value
f being unemployed decreases with the unemployment duration since
he remaining entitlement period to UI benefits decreases. Therefore,
he reservation wage declines and unemployed workers increase their
earch effort. When individuals are forward looking, shortening the UI
ntitlement period already increases job finding rates at the moment of
ntering unemployment. 
The standard theory predicts a smooth increase in job finding rates
ntil UI benefits exhaustion. Several empirical studies show the exis-
ence of spikes in exit rates towards UI benefits exhaustion (e.g. Katz
nd Meyer, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Moffitt, 1985 ). 2 Most studies find that
xit rates drop again after exhausting UI benefits. Various explanations
or the existence of spikes are provided in the literature, such as former
mployers reemploying laid-off workers at the moment of UI benefits ex-
austion ( Katz and Meyer, 1990 ) or employers and unemployed work-
rs agreeing to delay the starting date of a new job until UI benefits
xhaustion ( Boone and Van Ours, 2012 ). Focusing on spikes provides
nsight in job search behavior, but does not answer the policy relevant
uestion how the length of benefits entitlement affects exit rates from
nemployment. Answering this question requires exogenous variation
n the entitlement period. 
. Institutional setting 
In this section we first describe the Dutch UI system before the re-
orm in October 2006, which is the period evaluated by the regression
iscontinuity design. Next, we describe the changes induced by the re-
orm, which is analyzed using the difference-in-differences model. 
.1. Dutch UI system before october 2006 
The Dutch UI law insures all employees against the risk of unem-
loyment. 3 Entitlement to UI benefits requires that the worker loses at
east five working hours, or 50% of her working hours if she works less
han ten hours. The worker also has to satisfy the so-called weeks condi-
ion and years condition . 4 The weeks condition requires a worker to have
orked at least 26 of the previous 39 weeks. The years condition states
hat the worker should have been employed for at least four out of the
ast five calendar years. 
Workers satisfying both the weeks and the years condition were en-
itled to wage-related benefits equal to 70% of the last wage (capped at
 maximum) for at least six months. The maximum duration of collect-
ng UI benefits depends on the worker’s labor market history, which is a
unction of age and actual employment. Because the UI administration
oes not have employment records before 1998, the labor market his-
ory before 1998 is equal to the age of the worker on January 1, 1998
inus 18. For the years after 1998, the labor market history consists
f actual employment. For those years, a calendar year counts as em-
loyed if the worker worked at least 52 days in that year. If the worker
ad a labor market history of between five and ten years, the maximum
ength of the UI entitlement period was nine months. The maximum
ntitlement period increased with each interval of five additional years2 Within a standard job search model, some explanations have been given for 
he existence of spikes. For example, Mortensen (1977) explains the spike from 
n additional assumption that income and leisure are substitutes. 
3 The law excludes self-employed workers and some civil servants who have 
pecial arrangements. 
4 Workers satisfying the weeks condition, but not the years condition were 
ntitled to short term UI for six months equal to 70% of the minimum wage or 








197 f labor market history up to five years. This step function of the maxi-
um entitlement period will be exploited in the regression discontinuity
nalysis in combination with lack of records on the labor market history
efore 1998. When a UI benefits recipient leaves unemployment because
f an accepted job but enters unemployment again within six months,
he old UI spell is continued. 
Workers who are either not or no longer entitled to UI benefits, can
pply for welfare benefits. Welfare is means tested and complements
he household income to 50% of the minimum wage for a unlimited
ime period. Couples and single parents receive some additional bene-
ts. Job search requirements are similar for all benefits programs, re-
ipients have to make a job application at least once every week. 5 
.2. UI reform in october 2006 
The UI reform in October 2006 entailed four changes, which are
ummarized in Table 1 . First, the weeks condition was tightened from
aving worked 26 of the previous 39 weeks to having worked 26 of the
revious 36 weeks. Second, workers not satisfying the years condition
worked at least four of the past five years) are now entitled to short
erm UI with a level of 70% of their last wage instead of 70% of the
inimum wage. Third, the replacement rate in the first two months of
oth short term and long term UI is now 75% of the last wage and after-
ards 70% (both capped at the same maximum). Fourth, the length of
he entitlement period to long term UI is reduced for almost all benefits
ecipients. The length of the entitlement period is now a linear function
f labor market history, each additional year increased the UI entitle-
ent period by one month. 
We focus on the change in the entitlement period due to the reform
n our difference-in-differences analysis. Therefore, we only consider in-
ividuals who are entitled to long term UI benefits and we only consider
ndividuals who satisfy the slightly stricter weeks condition after the re-
orm. 6 
Fig. 1 shows the entitlement to UI benefits before and after October
006. The reform reduced the entitlement period most for individuals
ith long labor market histories. For workers with a labor market his-
ory of nine, 12, 18 and 24 years the entitlement period was unaffected
y the reform, while workers with a labor market history of 13, 14 or 19
ears were after the reform entitled to UI benefits for a longer period. In5 Whereas welfare benefits recipients have to accept all jobs, during the first 
ear UI benefits recipients only have to accept jobs that match their skill and 
age level. 
6 In Appendix A we consider individuals who entered UI just before and just 
fter the reform with a labor market history such that the UI entitlement pe- 
iod remains the same. We find similar job finding probabilities for both groups 
hich provides evidence that the increase in replacement rate during the first 
wo month of UI does not affect job search behavior. 
N. de Groot and B. van der Klaauw Labour Economics 57 (2019) 195–208 
Fig. 1. Entitlement to UI benefits before and af- 
ter the reform. Note: The regression discontinu- 
ity analysis exploits the jumps in the entitle- 
ment period before the reform. The difference-in- 
differences model uses the changes in entitlement 
period due to the reform. 








































8 In the data used for the regression discontinuity analysis we additionally he empirical analysis of the reform we exclude individuals with a labor
arket history of 13 and 14 years. Before the reform, the entitlement
eriod of these individuals did not exceed 12 months, and, therefore,
hese individuals did not receive extensive active labor market policies.
fter the reform, the entitlement period of these individuals exceeds
2 months and they became exposed to a regime with more extensive
ctive labor market policies. 7 
. Description of the data 
We use data provided by Statistics Netherlands that combine infor-
ation from various administrations covering the period from 1999 to
010. These data contain registrations at municipalities, the UI admin-
stration and the tax office, which include all payments of various types
f benefits and information on jobs such as wages, working hours, type
f contract (flexible or permanent), sector, etc. The data cover the full
utch population. We select only those UI benefits spells that satisfy
he years condition for collecting long-term UI benefits and the stricter
eeks condition which was in place after the reform of October 2006. 
We observe 1.8 million individuals who started collecting UI benefits
t least once between 1999 and 2010 and they experience over 3 million




198 hree months. The figure shows that the inflow follows the business cycle
losely and that there is no substantial change in the inflow around the
eform in October 2006. From the end of 2008 onwards the inflow into
I increased substantially. 
In the difference-in-differences analysis exploiting the UI reform we
nly consider individuals entering UI between July 1, 2004 and Decem-
er 31, 2008. This provides an interval of 27 months both before and
fter the reform. The regression discontinuity analysis focuses on the
umps in the maximum UI entitlement period in the time period be-
ore the reform. Because the calculation of labor market histories was
hanged in January 2004, we use data from individuals entering be-
ween January 2004 and September 2006 for the regression discontinu-
ty analysis. In this analysis, we focus on individuals born around the
anuary 1, threshold, as the individuals age on January 1, may increase
he labor market history with one year. 8 We discuss the identification
trategy of the regression discontinuity design in detail in Section 6 . 
For each UI spell we observe daily information about the start and
nd date of collecting benefits, and the level of benefits. We use the age
f the worker at January 1, 1998 and the actual employment historyxclude non-western immigrants who are often registered as being born on Jan- 
ary 1, if their exact birthday is unknown and UI benefits spells that start within 
ix months after the previous benefits spell ended. 
N. de Groot and B. van der Klaauw Labour Economics 57 (2019) 195–208 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of UI spells starting before and after the reform. a 
July 2004– October 2006–
September 2006 December 2008 
UI eligibility characteristics 
Labor market history (years) 20.6 21.2 
Potential UI entitlement before reform (months) 20.6 20.6 
Actual UI entitlement (months) 20.6 16.7 
Personal characteristics 
Female (%) 46.7 48.1 
Age at start unemployment (years) 39.0 40.2 
Couple (%) 63.3 62.1 
Partner with income (%) 37.7 39.1 
Single parent (%) 6.0 7.5 
Children (%) 38.6 38.8 
Immigrant (%) 19.7 21.1 
Annual earnings before UI b ( €) 34,103 33,091 
UI duration and job finding 
Median UI duration (days) 166 92 
Median duration until work (days) 152 119 
Found work within one year (%) 66.9 68.3 
Found work within three years (%) 82.8 80.3 
Number of jobs within three years 4.1 4.1 
Cumulative income 
Total UI benefits in three years after inflow b ( €) 14,836 12,673 
Total earned wage in three years after inflow b ( €) 55,997 54,888 
Job quality first job 
Annual earnings first job b ( €) 21,172 22,348 
Daily wage first job b ( €) 94.50 107.69 
Temporary contract in first job (%) 36.4 33.1 
Working hours in first job (per week) 27.6 27.8 
Number of spells 356,566 225,168 
Note: The sample described in this table is used in the difference-in-differences anal- 
ysis. The regression discontinuity analysis uses UI benefits spells starting between 
January 2004 and September 2006. a Statistics only include individuals entitled to 
long term UI benefits and satisfying the stricter weeks condition, which applies after 

















































t  ince 1999 to construct the maximum entitlement period before and
fter October 2006. 9 We correct for re-entering UI using the institutional
ules. 
From the registration of municipalities we obtain demographic vari-
bles, which we merge with the labor market information. The demo-
raphic variables contain, for example, date of birth, gender, household
omposition, etc. This allows us to identify the partner for which we ob-
erve labor market outcomes as well. Recall that the partners’ earnings
etermine whether someone will become eligible for welfare after UI
see Section 3 ). We construct a variable indicating potential eligibility
or welfare benefits and a variable measuring the partners’ earnings. 
Once an individual stops collecting UI benefits, we know if this was
ue to exhaustion of UI benefits. In that case we observe whether or not
he individual starts collecting welfare benefits. Otherwise we observe
ubsequent labor market outcomes, e.g. earnings, working hours and
ype of contract. We observe this information for each job. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the total UI inflow before
nd after the reform, which is used in the difference-in-differences anal-
sis. 10 Before the reform individuals had, on average, a labor market
istory of slightly less than 21 years. Individuals who entered UI after
he reform had a labor market history of roughly 0.6 years longer. If the9 We do not observe employment in 1998 while the UI administration does 
bserve actual employment for this year. We count 1998 as an employed year 
f the worker was at least 18 years old in 1998 and employed in 1999. 
10 The pre-reform data largely coincide with the data used in the regression dis- 
ontinuity analysis. The regression discontinuity analysis only focuses on the pe- 
iod from January 2004 until September 2006 and excludes non-western immi- 
rants from the data. Observed characteristics are balanced around the thresh- 
lds. Therefore, we do not provide separate summary statistics for this sample 











199 nstitutional rules from before the reform would apply the entitlement
o UI benefits would, on average, be 20.6 months for both individuals
efore and after the reform. The reform reduced the average UI entitle-
ent period with almost four months to 16.7 months. We observe some
ifferences in the composition of the total group of workers entering UI
efore and after the reform. After the reform, we observe more women,
 higher average age, more individuals who have a partner with an in-
ome above the welfare threshold, more immigrants and more single
arents. The regression discontinuity analysis does not exploit the re-
orm and in Subsection 6.2 we provide evidence that the composition
f workers is balanced around the relevant thresholds. In the next sec-
ion we show that the results of the difference-in-differences analysis are
obust against controlling for individual characteristics. 
The third panel of Table 2 shows the mean UI duration and aver-
ge job finding probabilities before and after the reform. Compared to
ndividuals who entered before the reform, we observe a large reduc-
ion in both the mean UI duration and the median duration until find-
ng work for individuals who entered after the reform. The percentage
f unemployed workers who found work within one year after entering
nemployment increased with, on average, 1.4 percentage points, while
he percentage of workers who found work within three years decreased
ith about 2.5 percentage points. Both individuals who entered before
nd after the reform have, on average, 4.1 jobs within the three years
fter entering unemployment. 
The fourth panel considers the cumulative income in the three years
fter inflow into UI. Given the decrease in the median UI duration, it is
ot surprising that the average UI benefits decreased with over € 2000.
he average cumulative earned wage is roughly € 1000 lower for indi-
iduals who entered after the reform. The characteristics of the first job
fter unemployment are given in the last panel. By construction, these
tatistics only include individuals who found a job within three years





















































































































12 Appendix C contains the same figures for UI benefits receipt and temporary fter UI inflow. Both the annual earnings and the daily wage have in-
reased after the reform. After the reform, fewer unemployed workers
ccept a temporary contract while the number of working hours slightly
ncreases. 
Appendix B provides some additional figures with data description.
hese figures provide descriptive evidence that a longer UI entitlement
eriod is associated with reduced job finding, but that the difference
lowly vanishes after the entitlement period ends. Furthermore, indi-
iduals with a longer UI entitlement period have higher accepted wages
n the first job. These accepted wages decline faster as the UI period
rogresses for individuals with long UI entitlement. These patterns may
e explained by the entitlement period, but can also reflect differences
n age and employment history. 
. Difference-in-differences analysis 
Job search theory predicts that after reducing the generosity of a
enefits scheme unemployed workers lower their reservation wage and
ncrease their search effort. A reduction in the entitlement period to
I benefits then reduces the expected length of an unemployment spell
nd decreases the subsequent job quality. In this section, we test these
ypotheses empirically using a difference-in-differences model that ex-
loits the reform in October 2006. 
.1. The model 
We specify a regression model to estimate the effects of reducing the
I entitlement period on various labor market outcomes Y it of individual
 who started collecting UI benefits at calendar time t 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐷 𝑖𝑡 + 
∑
ℎ 
𝛾ℎ 𝟙 { 𝐻 𝑖𝑡 = ℎ } + 𝑋 𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1)
he variable D describes the change (in months) in the UI entitlement
eriod due to the reform. Prior to October 2006, the variable D always
quals zero. We construct D such that if the reform reduces UI entitle-
ent with six months, D takes value six. For about 88% of the entrants
n UI after October 2006, the UI entitlement period is shorter than it
ould have been before the reform, thus for those individuals D > 0.
he parameter of interest 𝛿 should be interpreted as, for example, the
ncrease in exit probability due to reducing the entitlement period with
ne month. 
The entitlement period to UI benefits is determined by the labor mar-
et history. We include fixed effects 𝛾h for all possible values of the
abor market history H . As D depends on the labor market history, in-
luding these fixed effects controls for the endogeneity of D . The vec-
or X contains several worker characteristics which capture both per-
onal characteristics, UI history and characteristics of the last job be-
ore UI. With respect to the UI history, X contains a variable indicat-
ng if the worker returned to UI within six months and resumes the
revious UI spell. In that case, X also contains a variable describing
he previous elapsed UI duration, which takes the value zero in the
bsence of a previous UI spell. Other variables we include in X are
ender, household composition, ethnicity, whether or not someone col-
ected UI in the three years before, whether someone had a part-time
ob at the moment of UI inflow, earnings before entering UI, and sec-
or. 11 The time trend 𝜇 is specified using dummy variables for each
uarter of inflow in UI. This controls for calendar time variation in job
nding probabilities, for example, due to business cycle variation or
easonality. 
Our empirical model is a difference-in-differences model. Recall from
ection 3 that for some labor market histories the reform did not affect
he maximum entitlement period to UI benefits. More specifically, indi-
iduals with a labor market history of nine, 12, 18 and 24 years were11 Including these control variables does not affect the estimated effects of the 
eduction in UI entitlement. 
w
c
200 ot affected by the reform and they form the control group which iden-
ifies the time trend 𝜇. The treatment group consists of all individuals
or whom the maximum entitlement period would have been affected
y the reform, thus individuals with a labor market history different
rom nine, 12, 18 or 24 years, where for those entering after the re-
orm D ≠0. Within the treatment group D varies between − 2 and 22.
he fixed effects for the labor market histories control for differences
n exit rates between individuals with different labor market histories.
he identification of the effect of a change in the UI entitlement period
 hinges on a common trend between individuals with different labor
arket histories. 
We test the common trend assumption in two ways. First, we graph-
cally explore the trend in labor market outcomes Y before and after the
eform, where we distinguish between the control group and treatment
roup. Fig. 3 shows these trends for finding work within 12 months and
umulative earnings within three years after inflow UI. 12 Although the
evel of both the job finding probability and the cumulative earnings is
ower for the treatment group, the trends prior to the reform look simi-
ar and the difference between the treatment and control group appears
table. The same holds for other outcome measures. For cohorts after the
eform, the difference in job finding probabilities somewhat decreases,
hile we do not observe a change in the difference in cumulative earn-
ngs. 
We test the common trend assumption more formally by estimating
he regression model in Eq. (1) for all labor market outcomes, but using
nly the subsample of individuals who entered UI one year before the re-
orm. We include a placebo treatment variable, which supposes that the
eform occurred in March 2006 instead of October 2006 and substitute
 by the difference in months of UI entitlement if the individual would
ave been affected by the reform. D is zero for individuals who entered
etween October 2005 en March 2006. 13 We find that three of the 17
stimated placebo treatment effects are significant. However, job find-
ng within 36 months and number of jobs within three years are strongly
orrelated and we find opposite signs for finding work within six months
nd within 36 months. Given the graphical evidence and that we find
o effects on finding work within three, 12 and 24 months and on all
ariables describing wages, hours, contracts, income, earnings, benefits,
tc., we do not worry too much about the three significant coefficients
nd conclude that there is a common trend in outcome variables of the
reatment and control group. 
.2. Difference-in-differences estimated effects of reducing UI entitlement 
Table 3 presents the estimated effects of reducing the UI entitlement
eriod on various outcome measures for finding work, earnings, benefit
eceipt and job characteristics. Each estimate in the table represents the
stimated coefficient of the reduction in months for separate regressions
sing the difference-in-differences model. In each row, we also report
he mean outcome before the reform. The table shows that the estimated
ffects from a model specification with and without controlling for some
bserved individual characteristics are very similar. Controlling for in-
ividual characteristics only causes a modest change in the estimated
ffect of the wage and working hours in the first job. We interpret this
s evidence that there are no compositional changes in the inflow in
I due to the reform, but that there may be some (dynamic) selection
n job finding. Below we focus on the estimated effects controlling for
ndividual characteristics. 
The first panel considers finding work. The outcome variables take
alue one if someone finds work within three, six, 12 or 24 or 36 months,
espectively. 14 Reducing the UI entitlement period has no effect on theork. 
13 The estimated placebo effects are shown in Table C1 in Appendix C . 
14 If an individual finds work after UI exhaustion, this is included in the out- 
ome variables as well. 
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Fig. 3. Job finding probability within one year and cumulative earnings within three years by inflow cohort. Note: Individuals in the treatment group would 
experience a change in the UI entitlement period if they entered after the reform in October 2006. Individuals in the control group have the same entitlement period 














V  robability of finding work within three months, but the effects are sig-
ificant for longer observation periods. The reform reduced the UI en-
itlement period with, on average, four months. Therefore, due to the
eform the probability of finding work within six months after entering
I increased with about 4 ×0.0013 ≈0.005. The effects of the reform
ncrease as we consider a longer time window, the job finding proba-
ilities within two and three years increase with about 0.016. This is201 uite substantial if we take into account that before the reform 78% of
he individuals found work within two years and during the third year
fter inflow only five percent of all individuals find work. So, the re-
orm induced some individuals to find work, who would otherwise be at
isk of being unemployed for a long period. However, our estimated ef-
ects are relatively small compared to, for example, the effects found by
an Ours and Vodopivec (2006) , and the reduced UI entitlement period
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Table 3 
Estimated effects of reducing the UI entitlement period using the difference-in-differences 
model. 
(1) (2) Mean 
Job finding probabilities 
Finding work within 3 months − 0.0003 (0.0004) − 0.0005 (0.0004) 0.28 
Finding work within 6 months 0.0017 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0013 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.49 
Finding work within 12 months 0.0031 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0028 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.67 
Finding work within 24 months 0.0043 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0040 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.78 
Finding work within 36 months 0.0041 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0038 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.83 
Cumulative income, three years 
Total UI benefits − 113.08 ∗ ∗ ∗ (28.45) − 107.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ (24.97) 14,836 
Total earnings 255.58 ∗ ∗ ∗ (56.71) 226.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ (50.10) 55,997 
Total income 140.22 ∗ ∗ ∗ (51.99) 119.28 ∗ ∗ ∗ (41.22) 72,052 
Cumulative number of jobs, three years 
Number of jobs 0.0197 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0025) 0.0180 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0023) 3.85 
Job quality, first job 
Finding a job 0.0037 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0034 ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.82 
Daily wage − 0.078 (0.092) − 0.161 ∗ (0.084) 101.08 
Working hours 0.0269 ∗ ∗ (0.0110) 0.0129 (0.0094) 27.55 
Temporary contract 0.0022 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.0022 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.36 
Job quality, after 3 years 
Having a job 0.0037 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.0036 ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.65 
Daily wage − 0.062 (0.125) − 0.106 (0.104) 119.47 
Working hours 0.0252 ∗ (0.0143) 0.0207 ∗ (0.0120) 32.17 
Temporary contract − 0.0011 ∗ ∗ (0.0004) − 0.0011 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0004) 0.17 
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Labor market history fixed effects Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics No Yes 
Note: Each row and column represents a separate regression. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the level of region and quarter of inflow. ∗ significant at a level of 10%, ∗ ∗ 

































































15 Boone and Van Ours (2012) find that the spikes around exhaustion of UI 
benefits are larger for permanent jobs than for temporary jobs and regard this 
as evidence that spikes occur because unemployed workers delay their starting 
date of a new job until the moment of exhaustion of UI benefits. an not explain the total observed increase in job finding rates after the
eform. 
The second panel of Table 3 presents the effects of the UI entitlement
eriod on the cumulative income three years after entering UI. We con-
ider income from UI benefits, earned wages and the sum of UI benefits,
arned wage and welfare benefits (defined as total income). Shortening
he UI entitlement period with one month reduces, on average, total UI
enefits payments within three years after inflow with about 107 euros.
xpressed as a percentage of the average UI benefits payment these sav-
ngs are 0.7%. At the same time, the reduction increases the cumulative
arned wage with about 226 euros. The negative effect on UI benefits
s offset by the positive effect on wages and a one month reduction in-
reases the total income by 119 euros. 
The effects of reducing the UI entitlement period on the number of
obs within three years are given in the third panel of Table 3 . After re-
ucing the UI entitlement period, workers tend to find more jobs within
he first three years after entering UI. This can be due to increased job
nding in general, but it can also be a signal for reduced job quality as
orkers move to better jobs. 
Next, we consider job quality in more detail. Job search theory pre-
icts that when the benefits system is less generous, unemployed work-
rs reduce their job demands. Therefore, in the fourth panel we consider
s outcomes characteristics of the first job after unemployment. These
ob characteristics are only observed for the possibly selective sample
f workers who find work within the observation period. Such dynamic
election may bias the estimated effects, because the reform increased
ob finding rates. To get some idea about the size of this potential bias,
e estimate the effect of a one month reduction of the UI entitlement
eriod on the probability of having any job at all in the observed time
indow. The estimated effect implies that the average four months re-
uction in UI entitlement due to the reform increased job finding from
2.3% to 83.6%. The effect is significant but given the high job finding
ate, the selection bias will be modest. This is confirmed by the fact that
re-unemployment wages of those individuals who are observed to have
ound work are unaffected by the reform. 202 We find a small negative effect on the daily wage in the first
ob. Because the reform reduced the UI entitlement period with about
our months, individuals affected by the reform, on average, earn
4 cents per day less in their first job, which is about 0.63% of
he average daily wage. This is in line with earlier literature that
nds at most a small negative effect of a UI reduction on earnings.
enteno and Novo (2009) , Cockx and Picchio (2013) and Nekoei and
eber (2017) find a small positive effect of an extension of the enti-
lement period while Lalive (2007) and Card et al. (2007) do not find
ny effect and Schmieder et al. (2016) find a negative effect. From our
esults we can draw two conclusions. First, the effect of reduced skill
epreciation due to increased job finding on wages is smaller than the
educed reservation wage path. Second, the increased job finding domi-
ates the small decline in wages when considering cumulative earnings.
hese results suggest that individuals experience some disutility from
tarting working. Individuals often have a temporary contract in their
rst job, which is considered as a negative signal about job quality and
t provides less security than a permanent contract. 15 
In the final panel we present the effects on the quality of the job
hree years after inflow UI. Here we only consider workers who have a
ob three years after inflow, which is the case for about two-thirds of
he individuals. The reform increased the probability of having a job
fter three years by, on average, 1.4 percentage points, which means
hat we can not rule out that our job quality estimates are subject to
ynamic selection bias. In addition, we find that the pre-unemployment
age of post-reform workers who are employed after three years is, on
verage, 3% lower than the pre-unemployment wage of employed pre-
eform workers, which indicates that those employed after the reform,
n average, have less favorable characteristics. 


















































































































w  Our results do not show a significant effect on wages and a small
nd only marginally significant effect on working hours. The estimated
ffect on having a job with a temporary contract is negative. Com-
ined with the increased job finding this implies that the reform causes
hat three years after entering UI more workers manage to obtain a job
ith a permanent contract. Our preferred explanation is that the reform
timulates more individuals to find work quickly. First jobs are often
emporary jobs and, therefore, average job turnover is high and a sub-
tantial share of the individuals lose their job again. However, the in-
reased job finding eventually causes more individuals to have a job
ith a permanent contract after three years. These jobs are associated
ith higher wages, which explains the average wage growth between
he first job and the job after three years. 
.3. Robustness check and heterogeneous effects 
To separate the effects of the reduced UI entitlement period from cal-
ndar time effects, we exploit that the entitlement period did not change
or individuals with a labor market history of nine, 12, 18 and 24 years.
or individuals with longer labor market histories, e.g. more than 35
ears, the control group may be less appropriate. Therefore, we repeat
he regressions for a sample of unemployed workers with a labor market
istory shorter than 35 years. The results provided in Table D1 in the
ppendix D show larger effects of reducing the entitlement period for
ob finding within six and 12 months, while the effects are smaller on
ob finding within 24 months and zero on job finding within 36 months.
he results when restricted the sample to individuals with shorter enti-
lement periods, suggests that the effect on job finding only exists dur-
ng the actual entitlement period, and not in the period afterwards. We
rovide more evidence on this in Section 7 . The results on the other out-
omes are quite robust when restricting the sample, only the effect on
he daily wage becomes positive and significant. This may suggest that
he positive effect of less skill depreciation and more job opportunities
utweighs the negative effect of being less selective in accepting a job. 
In the previous subsection we provided the average effect of reducing
he UI entitlement period. We test whether responses differ by subgroup
y estimating our models on different subsamples stratified by gender
nd age. In addition, we consider heterogeneous effects by level of ben-
fits and entitlement to welfare benefits after exhausting UI. The group
ith low levels of UI benefits and potential entitlement to welfare ben-
fits is of special interest because these workers do not have to face an
ncome drop when exhausting UI benefits. Standard job search theory
redicts that for this group the effects of a reduction of the UI entitle-
ent period are limited, in particular since UI and welfare impose the
ame job search requirements on benefits recipients. 
We do not find substantial differences in the effects between men and
omen and also the benefits level and potential entitlement to welfare
enefits hardly affect the estimated effect. 16 The latter does not coincide
ith job search theory, but can be explained by the low take-up rate of
elfare benefits. In our data only 48% of the unemployed workers who
ecome eligible for welfare actually start collecting these benefits. 
Our estimation results indicate that young workers (under the age
f 35) respond less strongly to changes in the UI entitlement period.
he previous literature often exploits age thresholds between age 40
nd 55. According to our results this describes the population which is
ost responsive to the UI entitlement period. We do not find different
ffects for individuals between age 40 and 55 and individuals older than
5. The latter indicates that also older workers who may be close to
etirement or leaving the labor market otherwise change their job search
ehavior in response to changes in the UI entitlement period. 16 All estimation results can be found in Tables D2–D4 in Appendix D . 
l
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203 . Regression discontinuity design 
Before the reform in October 2006, the length of the UI entitlement
eriod was a stepwise function of labor market history (see Fig. 1 ). We
se a regression discontinuity design to exploit the jumps in the en-
itlement period to obtain additional estimates of the effect of the UI
ntitlement period. 
.1. The model 
Exploiting the thresholds for labor market years where the UI enti-
lement period increases would be an obvious choice for a regression
iscontinuity analysis. However, labor market years are discrete, and
e only observe four years before and after each threshold. Such a re-
ression discontinuity analysis can be based on at most two years be-
ore and two years after the threshold, which makes it difficult to esti-
ate the coefficient of the running variable. In addition, we find signif-
cant discontinuities in observable characteristics at the thresholds. Re-
all that the labor market history is a function of age and employment
ears, where employment years equals the number of years in which
he worker worked at least 52 days since 1998. Since only few individ-
als work less than 52 days a year, the 52-days threshold does not give
nough statistical power (and it can be manipulated by choosing the
ay-off date). 
We focus the regression discontinuity analysis on the age. Because
he UI administration does not have records of employment histories
efore 1998, the labor market history concerning years before 1998
quals the age on January 1, 1998 minus 18. We observe month of birth,
hich we exploit to identify the effect of a longer entitlement period.
ore specifically, we compare, for example, two individuals who both
ntered UI in January 2005 and were both employed for all the years
etween 1998 and 2004, but individual A was born in January 1977
nd individual B was born in December 1976. Individual A is, there-
ore, entitled to nine months and individual B is entitled to 12 months
f UI benefits. 
We specify the regression model which pools all thresholds indicated
y s : 
 𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛿𝐷 𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝜅𝑀 𝑖 + 𝜆𝑀 𝑖 𝟙 { 𝑀 𝑖 ≥ 0} + 𝛽𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑠 (2) 
 indicates the drop in UI entitlement at the threshold. So this variable
quals zero for individuals born in December or earlier and the differ-
nce (in months) in the UI entitlement period for individuals born in
anuary or later. The parameter 𝛿 has the same interpretation as in the
ifference-in-differences model and describes how a one month reduc-
ion in UI entitlement affects the outcome Y . The variable M describes
he number of months from a threshold where the entitlement is in-
reased. 17 The regression model is specified as a local linear model and
e prefer a bandwidth of 24 months around the thresholds. As a robust-
ess check we also consider bandwidths of 12 and 30 months around the
hreshold and a local quadratic model with a bandwidth of 24 months.
n all regressions, we control for the observed number of employed years
ince 1998 denoted by E and fixed effects for the quarter of inflow 𝜇t 
nd the thresholds 𝛼s . 
Recall from Section 4 for estimating the regression discontinuity
odel we use data on workers entering UI between January 2004 and
eptember 2006. We exclude immigrants from the analysis because for
ome immigrants the exact month of birth is unknown and in such cases
he month of birth is registered as January. Finally, we exclude the
hresholds at 12 and 24 months of UI entitlement, because unemployed
orkers with more than 12 or 24 months of UI entitlement are more
ikely to participate in more intensive active labor market programs. 17 Being born in January implies that 𝑀 = −1 , being born in December gives 
 = 0 , being born in November implies 𝑀 = 1 , etc. 
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Fig. 4. Density of observations around the threshold where the UI entitlement 
period increases, pooled. Note: Pre-reform period, January 2004-September 
2006. At month 0 (December), the entitlement period increases. Observations 
around the thresholds of 12 to 18 months and 24 to 30 months are excluded. 
Table 4 
Estimates of McCrary test for discontinuities 
around the thresholds. 
Coefficient Standard error 
Pooled − 0.014 (0.032) 
9 to 12 months 0.073 (0.064) 
18 to 24 months − 0.073 (0.065) 
30 to 36 months 0.022 (0.072) 
36 to 48 months − 0.120 (0.075) 
48 to 60 months 0.018 (0.081) 
Note: Each row in the table represents a separate 
regression. Bandwidth around the threshold of 3 
months. ∗ significant at a level of 10%, ∗ ∗ signif- 

























Fig. 5. Average age at inflow into UI (upper panel) and average annual wage 
before inflow into UI (lower panel), by length of the labor market history. Note: 
Pre-reform period, January 2004–September 2006. The solid lines represent lin- 
ear fits for every interval between thresholds where the UI entitlement period 
increases. The vertical dashed lines denote the labor market history where the 

















fi  .2. Testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design 
To test the validity of our regression discontinuity design, we per-
orm three tests. First, we test if around the threshold the distribution
f entry in UI is continuous. Fig. 4 does not provide evidence that in-
ividuals with longer UI entitlement (right of the threshold) are more
ikely to enter UI. In Table 4 we show the results of the test proposed by
cCrary (2008) . The results do not provide evidence for discontinuities
n the densities around the different thresholds, also not when pooling
ll thresholds. 
Second, we test for discontinuities in observed characteristics around
he thresholds. In Fig. 5 we plot the average age at inflow into UI and
he annual pre-unemployment wage, by length of the labor market his-
ory. We observe a smooth distribution of both individual characteris-
ics around all thresholds. 18 A formal test for discontinuities in observed
haracteristics around the threshold shows only a significant jump for
aving children in the threshold (out of 11 different characteristics). 19 
he estimated jump for children is, however, small and the results of our
egression discontinuity estimation are not sensitive to including having
hildren as covariate (and also not to including other covariates). 
Our third test for the validity of the regression discontinuity design
ocuses on discontinuities around placebo thresholds two years from the
ctual thresholds where the UI entitlement period increases (i.e. around18 Fig. E1 in the Appendix E shows that the distributions of other covariates 
re also smooth around the thresholds. 
19 See Table E1 in Appendix E for the estimation results. 
T  
204 2, 17, 22, 27, 32 and 37 labor market years). We estimate a local linear
pecification with a bandwidth of 24 months around the placebo thresh-
lds, controlling for calendar time and actual employment years. We do
ot observe any discontinuities in the job finding rate within 12 months,
umulative UI benefits, earnings and number of jobs within three years.
ut of 25 outcome variables, only two placebo effects are significant at
he 10% level. 20 Because pure chance predicts about the same number
f (marginally) significant placebo effects, we interpret these results as
vidence for the validity of our regression discontinuity design. 
.3. Regression discontinuity estimates for the effects of reducing UI 
ntitlement 
In this subsection we discuss the results of the regression discontinu-
ty estimation of the effects of reducing UI entitlement. 
Fig. 6 shows graphical evidence for four outcomes where we pool
ll thresholds. 21 We observe a jump in the probability of finding work
ithin 12 months. This increased job finding causes that total UI bene-
ts payment within three years after entering unemployment declines.
he jump in cumulative earnings has about the same size as the jump in20 All results can be found in Fig. E2 and Table E2 in Appendix E . 
21 The same graphs for other outcomes are in Fig. F1 in Appendix F . 
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Fig. 6. Outcomes around the thresholds where UI entitlement increases, pooled. Note: Average probability to find a job within 12 months (left upper panel) and 
cumulative UI benefits right upper panel), cumulative earnings (left lower panel) and number of jobs (right lower panel) within three years after inflow into UI. 


















































w  I benefits, but is less pronounced since earnings are much more noisy
han benefits payments. The final graph shows that reducing the UI en-
itlement period causes individuals to have more jobs in the three years
fter entering unemployment. 
The estimation results of the pooled regression discontinuity anal-
sis are given in Table 5 . Since the regression discontinuity design ex-
loits jumps in the UI entitlement period before the reform, we have a
onger observation period than in the difference-in-differences analysis
nd can report effects up to five years after starting collecting UI. The
rst panel shows the effects on job finding. The estimated effects from
egression discontinuity estimation are almost identical to the results
f the difference-in-differences analysis in Table 3 , only the effect on
ob finding within three years is slightly larger. The second and third
anel consider cumulative income within three and five years after UI
nflow. We find that a reduction in the UI entitlement period decreases
he cumulative UI benefits and increases the cumulative earnings. This
esult is very similar to the difference-in-differences estimates, only the
oint estimates in the regression discontinuity analysis are larger. The
egression discontinuity design thus also shows a positive effect on total
ncome, but this is insignificant due to a large standard error. The ef-
ects on UI benefits and earnings increase when considering the longer
ime window of five years. In particular, after five years a one month re-
uction in UI entitlement decreases cumulative UI benefits by €459 and
ncreases cumulative earnings by €719. The same pattern is observed
n the fourth panel, where the effect on the number of jobs is slightly
igher after five years than after three years. 205 The last three panels show the results on the quality of the first job
nd the jobs after three and five years. In contrast to the results of the
ifference-in-differences analysis, we do not find evidence of lower qual-
ty of the first job in terms of lower wages or more temporary contracts.
he regression discontinuity estimates show a small positive effect on
he working hours of the first job and no effects on job quality after
hree years. However, a shorter UI entitlement period does increase the
aily wage and the number of working hours of the job after five years.
We can exploit the jump in the UI entitlement period at each thresh-
ld separately. Job search theory predicts that effects are largest for
nemployed workers with short entitlement periods. This is confirmed
y our empirical results. 22 If we look at the effects on job finding within
ne year, the results are largest when the UI entitlement period is re-
uced from 12 to nine months. If we consider longer periods, we find a
ignificant effect on job finding within 18 months at the 18 to 24 months
hreshold and a significant effect on job finding within 60 months at the
8–60 months threshold. This indicates that the increased job finding
ue to a shorter entitlement period occurs at the end of the reduced
ntitlement period. We further investigate this in the next section. 
To test the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to the
odel specification, we first replace the local linear trend in birth month
ith a quadratic specification. Most estimated coefficients are slightly
maller, but differences are most often not significant. As a second test
e vary the bandwidth around the thresholds from 24 months to 12 and22 The estimation results are in Table F1 in Appendix F . 
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Table 5 
Regression discontinuity estimates of the effects of reducing the UI entitle- 
ment period. 
Coefficient Standard error Mean 
Effects on job finding 
Finding work within 6 months 0.0018 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0006) 0.47 
Finding work within 12 months 0.0031 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.66 
Finding work within 24 months 0.0039 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.77 
Finding work within 36 months 0.0050 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.82 
Finding work within 60 months 0.0056 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.83 
Effects on cumulative income, 3 years 
Total UI benefits − 249 ∗ ∗ ∗ (32) 19,539 
Total earnings 323 ∗ ∗ ∗ (107) 66,296 
Total income 72 (105) 86,194 
Effects on cumulative income, 5 years 
Total UI benefits − 459 ∗ ∗ ∗ (49) 21,678 
Total earnings 719 ∗ ∗ ∗ (175) 114,294 
Total income 259 (178) 136,761 
Effects on cumulative number of jobs 
Number of jobs, 3 years 0.0185 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0028) 3.81 
Number of jobs, 5 years 0.0339 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0043) 5.73 
Effects on job quality, first job 
Finding a job 0.0041 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0006) 0.89 
Daily wage 0.07 (0.14) 113.44 
Working hours 0.031 ∗ (0.016) 28.4 
Temporary contract − 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.28 
Effects on job quality, after 3 years 
Having a job 0.0046 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0006) 0.65 
Daily wage 0.04 (0.16) 133.15 
Working hours 0.023 (0.017) 32.5 
Temporary contract 0.000 (0.001) 0.12 
Effects on job quality, after 5 years 
Having a job 0.0034 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.0005) 0.45 
Daily wage 0.41 ∗ ∗ (0.19) 137.83 
Working hours 0.044 ∗ ∗ (0.022) 32.4 
Temporary contract -0.001 (0.001) 0.09 
Note: Each cell in the table represents a separate regression. All regressions 
are estimated using a local linear specification with a bandwidth of 24 months 
around the thresholds and include calendar time fixed effects and actual em- 
ployment history (after 1998) fixed effects as controls. Standard errors are 
clustered at the level of region and quarter of inflow. ∗ significant at a level 
















































































d  0 months. Reducing the bandwidth to 12 months again slightly reduced
he estimated effects, while increasing the bandwidth to 30 months has
o effect on the estimated effects. 23 Changing the model specification
hus does not change our conclusions about the effects of reducing the
aximum UI entitlement period. Therefore, we conclude that the re-
ression discontinuity estimates are robust against changing the model
pecification. 
.4. Comparing estimated effects from regression discontinuity and 
ifference-in-differences 
The difference-in-differences analysis and the regression discontinu-
ty design show very similar results on job finding, benefits payment and
arnings. However, the difference-in-differences estimates show that re-
ucing the UI entitlement period decreases the quality of the first job,
hile regression discontinuity shows a small positive effect on job qual-
ty. In this subsection we discuss these differences. 
There can be several reasons why regression discontinuity gives dif-
erent results on job quality than the difference-in-differences analysis.
stimated effects for job quality may suffer from dynamic selection bias
ue the fact that we only observed a first job for the selective sample of
nemployed workers who finds work within the observation period. In-
eed, these estimated effects are less robust against including individual





206 egression discontinuity design and the difference-in-differences analy-
is, causing a different bias in both estimated effects. Two reasons why
ynamic selection may differ are that the sample affected by the reform
iffers from the sample affected by the thresholds, and both methods
tudy a different observation period with also a different length. 
The difference-in-differences approach considers the reform of Oc-
ober 2006, while the regression discontinuity design exploits discon-
inuities in the period before the reform. Recall that reducing the UI
ntitlement period reduces reservation wages and increases job search
ffort. This causes unemployed workers to be less selective in which job
ffer to accept, but also loose fewer skills during unemployment. The
egression discontinuity design focuses on a period of increasing un-
mployment rates, while the difference-in-differences analysis consider
 period of decreasing unemployment rates. In economic downturn it
ay be more important to find work fast and the consequences of skill
epreciation may be larger when more unemployed workers compete
or fewer jobs. In periods of economic growth job opportunities may
ecline at a slower rate when being unemployed. 
Regression discontinuity and difference-in-differences both estimate
 weighted average of marginal treatment effects. However, the thresh-
lds in the regression discontinuity design provide identification for dif-
erent groups of workers than the reform considered in the difference-
n-differences approach, and both thus apply different weights to the
arginal treatment effects. In our regression discontinuity design no
ffect can be identified for groups of workers who respond relatively
trongly in the difference-in-differences analysis, i.e. immigrants and
nemployed workers around the 12–18 and 24–30 months thresholds.
inally, recall that where the literature always finds that reducing the
I entitlement period stimulates job finding, there is no consensus on
he effects on the worker-job match. Our result that the estimated effects
iffer between identification strategies, the data and the time periods is
onsistent with the literature. 
. Modeling job finding 
In the previous sections we showed that reducing the maximum UI
ntitlement period increases the probability of finding work. In this sec-
ion we explore the underlying dynamics in job finding during the un-
mployment spell using a hazard rate model. This model describes exit
o work after 𝜏 periods of unemployment for an individual who enters UI
t calendar time t with an observed UI entitlement max UI , labor market
istory H and other observed characteristics X , 
( 𝜏|𝑡, 𝐻, 𝑋) = 𝜆( 𝜏) 𝜙( max 𝑈𝐼 − 𝜏) 𝜑 ( max 𝑈𝐼, 𝑡, 𝑋, 𝐻) (3) 
here 𝜆( 𝜏) denotes duration dependence in job finding. Our function of
nterest, 𝜙( max 𝑈𝐼 − 𝜏) , describes how the job finding rate is affected
y the remaining entitlement period after 𝜏 days of unemployment.
e specify 𝜙( max 𝑈𝐼 − 𝜏) as a piecewise constant function. In the func-
ion 𝜑 (max UI, t, H, X ), we allow the length of UI entitlement to have
 constant effect on job finding from the start of unemployment. To
ccount for endogeneity of the UI entitlement period we include cal-
ndar time indicators and fixed effects for the labor market history H .
inally, we include the same covariates X as in the regressions discussed
n Section 5 . We use Cox partial likelihood method to estimate the haz-
rd rate, thereby leaving 𝜆( 𝜏) unspecified. 
Given that we restrict the model to a proportional specification, the
dentification of the causal effects of UI entitlement is similar as in the
ifference-in-differences model specified in Section 5 . The control group
f individuals who are not affected by the reform identifies the calen-
ar time effects. The labor market histories H control for differences
etween individuals with different employment histories or age, and
he effects of the UI entitlement period are identified from interactions
etween calendar time and labor market histories. This identification
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Table 6 
Estimated effects of the UI entitlement period from a hazard rate model for 
finding work. 
Coefficient Standard error 
UI entitlement (in months) -0.010 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.002) 
Time until/after exhaustion 
More than 6 months after exhaustion − 0.201 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.013) 
3–6 months after exhaustion 0.021 (0.013) 
1–3 months after exhaustion 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.012) 
First month after exhaustion 0.240 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.013) 
Last month until exhaustion 0.239 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.011) 
1–3 months until exhaustion 0.140 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.008) 
3–6 months until exhaustion, (reference category) 0 
6–12 months until exhaustion − 0.064 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.006) 
12–24 months until exhaustion − 0.093 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.008) 
More than 24 exhaustion until exhaustion − 0.100 ∗ ∗ ∗ (0.013) 
Note: The model includes calendar time fixed effects, labor market history fixed 
effects and individual characteristics as controls. ∗ significant at a level of 10%, 































































































3  inges again on a common trend in exit rates to work between individ-
als with different labor market histories. 24 
Table 6 shows the estimated effects of the UI benefits entitlement
eriod on the job finding rate. 25 The estimation results show that
ncreasing the UI entitlement period significantly reduces the job find-
ng rate. Each additional month of UI entitlement reduces the job finding
ate from the start of the spell by about 1%. There is a clear peak in the
xit rate to work around the moment of exhaustion. The job finding rate
s highest in the month before and the month after exhausting UI bene-
ts. The exit rate increases as the moment of exhaustion is approaching
nd declines again in the six months after exhaustion to the reference
evel before exhaustion. 
Standard job search models predict that job finding rates stay con-
tant after exhaustion of UI benefits as reservation wages remain low
nd job search effort high. Like many previous empirical studies, we find
hat job finding rates actually fall after UI benefits exhaustion. This pat-
ern is often found in the literature (e.g. Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer,
990; Moffitt, 1985 ) and suggests that not only the level of benefits is
mportant in explaining the transition rate from unemployment to em-
loyment. 
Standard job search theory predicts larger peaks in the exit rate
o work around the moment of exhaustion for individuals who face a
arger income drop after UI exhaustion (e.g. Van den Berg, 1990 ). Our
ndings are in line with this, we find the largest peak for individuals
ith high UI benefits and entitlement to welfare and individuals with-
ut welfare entitlement. 26 For individuals not facing an income drop,
e observe a much smaller peak in the exit rate to work in the months
efore and after exhaustion. This indicates that the level of benefits is
ot the only element of the benefits program which is important for job
nding. The moment of exhausting UI benefits may be considered as an
mplicit deadline to unemployed workers, for example, because there is
 larger negative stigma associated to collecting welfare benefits than
I benefits. Alternatively, the transition from UI to welfare may be as-
ociated with uncertainty, which unemployed workers dislike. Finally,
ecall that the take-up rate of welfare benefits is only 48%, so some un-
mployed workers voluntarily accept a drop in income at the end of UI24 We artificially censor all unemployment spells after three years. This avoids 
hat for the pre-reform data we have a longer observation period and also re- 
uces the impact of the financial crisis which started to affect the Dutch labor 
arket late 2011. 
25 We take the time interval three to six months before exhaustion as the refer- 
nce category since the minimum entitlement period is four months. As such, for 
very possible length of the entitlement period there are individuals observed 
n the reference category. 












207 ntitlement. The results also indicate that unemployed workers change
heir job search behavior earlier in anticipation of a benefits drop if this
rop is more substantial. When we compare other subgroups, we ob-
erve larger peaks for individuals with an entitlement to more than 12
onths, men and individuals older than 50. 
. Conclusion 
In this paper we use two identification strategies to study the effect
f the entitlement period to UI benefits on the exit rate to work and
ost-unemployment job quality. First, we use a difference-in-differences
odel which exploits a substantial reform in the Dutch UI system in
ctober 2006. The reform reduced, on average, the entitlement period
y about four months, but there are groups of workers for whom the
ntitlement period did not change or even increased. Second, we use a
egression discontinuity design which exploits that prior to the reform
he entitlement period was a step function of the worker’s labor market
istory. Based on month of birth, we identify workers with an identical
umber of employment years but a different UI entitlement period. The
ifference just below and above the thresholds is, on average, seven
onths and can be at most 12 months. 
The estimation results on job finding rates from both approaches con-
ur, and are in agreement with earlier literature. We find that reducing
he UI entitlement period increases the job finding rate, which indicates
he presence of moral hazard. A 10-week extension of benefits increases
he non-employment time with 6–9 days. We have used a hazard rate
odel to estimate the underlying dynamics in job finding. This model
hows that reducing the entitlement period increases job finding rates
rom the start of unemployment, but job finding rates peak just before
he moment of exhausting UI benefits and declines again afterwards. All
stimates stress that a reduction in the UI entitlement period decreases
umulative UI benefits and increases cumulative earnings, which results
n an increased total income. 
Whereas there is consensus in the empirical literature on the effect
f the UI entitlement period on job finding, empirical evidence on the
ffects on job quality is mixed. Job search theory states two opposite
ffects of reducing the maximum UI entitlement period on job quality,
.e. unemployed workers lower their reservation wage and they might
uffer less from skill depreciation because they find work faster. The
ifference-in-differences analysis shows at most modest negative effects
f reducing the UI entitlement period on the quality of the first job.
e find some indication that unemployed workers are slightly more in-
lined to accept a temporary job. Job turnover after starting working
gain is high, causing that in the long run the effect on the job find-
ng rate is the dominating factor. However, the regression discontinuity
nalysis shows a positive effect on the number of working hours in the
rst job, and a positive effect on the daily wage in the long run. Both
pproaches identify the effect of reducing the UI entitlement period for
 different treated population in a different time period with different
abor market conditions. In particular, the regression discontinuity anal-
sis cannot identify effects from groups of workers who are observed to
espond relatively strongly in the difference-in-differences analysis. 
We find some heterogeneity in effects of the UI entitlement period.
irst, young workers are much less responsive than workers above age
5. Most previous studies exploit age thresholds in benefits entitlement,
hich lie between 40 and 55 years old. Young workers have, there-
ore, not received much attention. Second, the effect of reducing the
I entitlement period is most substantial for unemployed workers with
lready relatively short UI entitlement periods and occurs just before
he UI entitlement period expires. This is consistent with the spike in
ob finding rates just before exhausting benefits and the conclusion that
nemployed workers have relatively high discount rates. 
We use our empirical results from the difference-in-differences anal-
sis to quantify the expenditures associated to the UI reform in 2006. We
onsider the cohort of workers entering UI the year before the reform
nd follow them for three years. Total expenditures on UI benefits within






































hese three years equal 2756 million euros. Our empirical results show
hat the reform reduces this by 86 million euros, which is a reduction
f 3.1%. At the same time, due to increased job finding the cumulative
arnings within three years increases with 182 million euros and the
umulative income – the sum of UI benefits, wages and welfare benefits
increased with 96 million euros. If the reform would have been im-
lemented one year earlier, the total income of individuals within this
eriod would have increased with 0.6%. 
upplementary materials 
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the
nline version, at 10.1016/j.labeco.2019.02.003 . 
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